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Abstract
Purpose – Despite regulatory claims of straitening volatility and preventing crashes, evidences on circuit
breakers’ ability to achieve so are nonconclusive. While previous scholars studies general performances of
circuit breakers, the authors examine whether Malaysian price limits aggravate volatility, impede price
discovery, and interfere with trading activities in both tranquil and stressful periods.
Design/methodology/approach – The study uses a combination of parametric and nonparametric
techniques consistent with Kim and Rhee (1997) to examine the major ex-post hypotheses in circuit breaker
research.
Findings – For calm markets, the authors find significant success of upper limits in tempering volatility with
low trading interference. Lower limits show mixed results. Conversely, in crisis markets limits fare poorly in
nearly all aspects, particularly for lower limits.
Practical implications – Ramifications of the paper’s findings are discussed through highlighting the
asymmetric nature of price limits’ ex-post effects. The paper also contributes to regulatory debate surrounding
the quest for an optimal price limit.
Originality/value – The paper is the first of its kind in documenting long-horizon evidence of ex-post effects
of a wide-band price limit. Moreover, the paper is unique in its approach in bifurcating circuit breaker
performance along the line of market stability periods.
Keywords Circuit breaker, Price limits, Trading halts, Malaysia, Financial crisis
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Circuit breaker is an umbrella termused in finance literature to denote an array of constrictive
and/or cessative levers employed by regulators to confine intraday price movements within a
preset or discretionary channel. Circuit breakers are broadly of two types: trading halts
(suspension of trade) and price limits. This praxis in financial markets has skirted
controversy since inception and subsequent adoption since late 1980s. After inchoate
postulations of theoretical benefits of such microstructure barriers by the Brady Commission
Report (1988) and several academics, concerns about innate conceptual flaws and unintended
detriments of the practice surfaced in the wake of budding empirical findings in mid-1990s.
Since then, theoretical development in the discipline has stagnated. Instead, academia’s focus
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shifted primarily to empirical testing of emergent hypotheses in various geographical regions
and sampling periods. The findings, often conflicting or ambiguous, were criticized for design
flaws and lack of statistical power. Thus, though the theoretical ennui wasn’t reversed by
producing an overarching framework of circuit breakers’ effects, a quasi-consensus emerged
around hypothesized disadvantages of circuit breakers. These include possibilities of circuit
breakers encouraging splashing of volatility into future trading days by stifling trade on the
trigger day, causing delay in discovery of equilibrium price, interference in traders’
strategized trading plans, and inducing an ex-ante gravitational pull toward the trigger. The
four hypotheses are now formally known—respectively—as volatility spillover, delayed
price discovery, trading interference, and magnet effect. Empirical tests of the ex-post
hypotheses trio spurmore debate than settle. That prices continue in the same direction as the
limit has been documented via positive return autocorrelation in multiple studies done on
Seoul, Tokyo, Warsaw, and Istanbul (Bildik and Gulay, 2006; Henke and Voronkova, 2005;
Shen andWang, 1998). Reversals too have been observed inTaiwan, Shanghai, and Shenzhen
(Chen et al., 2005; Chou et al., 2006). Volatility spillover has been recorded in Taiwan and
Tokyo (Kim and Sweeney, 2002; Wong et al., 2008), while opposite findings were reported in
Shanghai and Seoul (Berkman and Lee, 2002; Kim et al., 2013a, b). For futures markets, Chou
et al. (2005) show that whether price limits are effective depends largely on risk appetite of
investors. In Malaysia, price limits have been shown to aggravate order imbalance, worsen
information asymmetry, and contribute to delayed arrival of informed traders to the limit
order queue (Chan et al., 2005). As for the ex-ante (magnet) effect, the lure of accelerated
trading activities near the trigger point beyond a certain threshold has been demonstrated for
stocks inTaiwan (Cho et al., 2003), Istanbul (Bildik andGulay, 2006), China (Wong et al., 2009),
and Japan (Nobanee and Al Hajjar, 2017). The opposite is recorded in Taiwan (Huang et al.,
2001), Spain (Abad and Pascual, 2007), and China (Kim et al., 2013a, b). As for futures, mostly
repellant effect (opposite of magnet effect) has been observed in US Treasury Bond Futures
(Arak and Cook, 1997), Nikkei 225 Futures (Martens and Steenbeek, 2001), and Orange Juice
Futures on NYBOT (Hall and Kofman, 2001).
A distinguishing feature of ex-post vs ex-ante effect studies is that due to the inherently
intraday nature of the magnet effect, end-of-day closing price data sets are ineffective in
capturing the existence of a gravitational pull of the trigger point in hastening order flow
(Sifat and Mohamad, 2018). Yet, many early researchers, presumably due to dearth of
granular data, improvised with daily data sets by using overnight returns or jumps as a
predictor of magnet effect the following day. These attempts, though necessary at the time,
remain methodologically suboptimal. As for the ex-post hypotheses, daily data sets are
adequate and traditionally used to compare volatility, price reversal, and trading activity
performances on and after the trigger-hit day. In this approach, the trigger-hit group is pitted
against a control group (pseudo-hit or quasi-hit) to determine whether volatility worsens,
price discovery is delayed, and traders’ activities are hindered (Sifat and Mohamad, 2018).
The locus of current circuit breaker research focuses on amassing empirical evidences for or
against circuit breaker efficacy in various markets. Considering the gamut of studies conducted
so far, onemarket stands out as a puzzle in the empiric corpus: Malaysia, a life-long exponent of
anunusuallywide±30 percent price limit. Themostwidely citedmajor study conducted onprice
limits inMalaysia focuses on order imbalance, informational arrival, and asymmetry (Chan et al.,
2005). While these issues are important to market microstructure literature, the authors—
surprisingly—avoided all the major ex-post and ex-ante circuit breaker hypotheses. What’s
more, the study’s sample size consists of two years: 1995–1996, a period when the-then Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) was a diminutive floor-trade bourse of scant global relevance.
Besides, since 1996, the bourse fine-tuned its limit metrics a few times, underwent
demutualization, instituted market makers, introduced short selling, and moved to an
automated trading platform. Malaysia, too, graduated from “frontier” status and now—apart
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from being a regional finance hub—commands global attention owing to high capital inflow.
Also, since 1996, Malaysia endured two major crises: Asian Financial Crisis (AFC: 1997) and
Global Financial Crisis (GFC: 2008). Therefore, aside from theall-purpose questions ofMalaysian
limits’ efficacy, crisis-centered investigation ofwhether price limits aided in achieving regulatory
objectives of curbing volatility, enhancing price discovery, and promoting trading activities
makes Bursa Malaysia an exciting laboratory for testing the ex-post hypotheses. To bridge this
gap, this paper utilizes a proprietary daily data set from 1994 to 2017 and examines whether the
most prominent objections to circuit breakers hold across crisis and calm periods.
The rationale for choosingMalaysia as the venue for this research ismanifold. First, Bursa
Malaysia uses a very wide band of price limit, set at 30 percent. This is considerably wider
than most other venues and therefore more interesting. Besides, a large swathe of empirical
testing on price limits’ efficacy is conducted on predominantly narrower price limit bands,
which some consider overly restrictive. Thus, the question of whether price limits are good or
bad can be further narrowed down to whether narrow/wide limits are bad/worse. Lastly,
examining a wide band limit contributes to the ongoing debate on the optimum range of a
price limit. Though it may be intuitive that wide price limits may be innocuous, prior
widening experimentation by Thailand and Korea in the late 1990s yielded ambiguous
results (Sifat and Mohamad, 2018). Consequently, understanding the repercussions of a wide
band limit remains a significant policy issue and warrants a deeper scrutiny due to its
regulatory and policy-related import.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss our data properties and outline
subperiod designation. Next, we adumbrate the hypotheses and techniques to test them,
followed by presentation of results. Lastly, the findings are recapitulated, and suggestions
are advanced for future research in the area.
2. Data and subperiod assignment
Daily data is retrieved from the bourse’s proprietary package that includes all opening,
close, high, low, volume, shares outstanding, and open interest information for all
instruments from 1994. The 23-year sampling period (Jan 1994 to Jan 2017) involved two
major crises: AFC and GFC. For precise regime dates, exponentially weighted moving
average cross-over technique was employed on daily composite index (FBMKLCI) values to
detect change points in 1997–1998 and 2007–2008.
EWMA ¼ σ2 ¼ λ2t−1 þ ð1 λÞr2t−1;t (1)
λhere is a memory parameter with a value between 0 and 1. A high λ implies longer memory,
meaning higher look-back days are needed to incorporate new changes. Experimenting with
different λ values, the crisis periods were consolidated as February 24, 1997 to September 1,
1998 and January 11, 2008 to August 16, 2008. The resultant subperiods and sample
summary stats are presented in Tables I and II.
3. Methodology
3.1 Hypotheses
We test three ex-post hypotheses identified by Sifat and Mohamad (2018) as the main
objections to price limits’ efficacy: volatility spillover, price discovery delay, and trading
interference (Table III). This paper adopts the methodology pioneered by Kim and Rhee
(1997) to test volatility spillover, delayed price discovery, and trading interference. For the
first hypothesis, Kim and Rhee (1997) supposed that the volatility of a stock on day t is
Vt5 (rt)
2 x 103, where rt denotes the return on day t. Thus, they select the daywhen the limit is
triggered as day 0 (t 5 0) and construct an event window 10 days before and after it. This
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Start date End date
Trading
days Subperiod ΔFBMKLCI Remarks
1/3/1994 2/21/1997 772 Tranquil
period 1
2.037% ±30% price limit in action since
Dec 1989
2/24/1997 9/1/1998 377 Asian
Financial
Crisis
157.174% Capital control enacted by Govt.,
defying IMF bail-out. Short selling
banned
9/2/1998 1/10/2008 2,301 Tranquil
Period 2
175.296% Migration to automated trading
platform (SCORE)
Introduction of market makers and
market-wide circuit breaker
1/11/2008 10/29/2008 199 Global
Financial
Crisis
59.631% Relatively insulated from direct
effects of global financial exposure.
Yet, market lost half its value
Bear period not as protracted as
global markets
10/30/2008 11/30/2011 762 Tranquil
Period 3 (a)
54.502% Short selling returns, albeit with
stringent caveats
12/1/2011 1/31/2017 1,271 Tranquil
Period 3 (b)
13.651% Advent of BTS2 Trading platform
With it dynamic “intraday” price
limit of ±8% is introduced in
addition to prevailing ±30% static
limit
Note(s): This table shows the demarcated subperiods examined in this paper, identified through EWMA
crossover technique commonly used by technical analysts. Moreover, the number of trading days in each
subperiod, performance of the benchmark index in that period, and relevant comments are provided. Total
trading days amount to 5,682 days
Subperiod Sc Sc % Spc Spc % Sf Sf % Spf Spf %
1st Tranquil Period 30 2.404 53 2.131 307 7.210 534 7.203
Asian Crisis 37 2.965 55 2.211 712 16.721 1,189 16.037
2nd Tranquil Period 207 16.587 411 16.526 267 6.271 566 7.634
Global Crisis 412 33.013 753 30.277 893 20.972 1,589 21.432
3rd Tranquil Period (Old limit) 802 64.263 1,214 48.814 1,513 35.533 2,602 35.096
3rd Tranquil Period (New limit) 61 4.888 81 3.257 566 13.293 934 12.598
Total 1,549 100% 2,567 100% 4,258 100% 7,414 100%
Note(s): This table shows the number of limit-hit and pseudo-hit days identified according to regimes. The
subgroups Sc, Spc, Sf, and Spf refer to ceiling, pseudo-ceiling, floor, and pseudo-floor stocks
Hvsh Price limits spread volatility over a long period instead of a single day
Hence, limits do not reduce volatility
Hdpd Assets hitting upper (lower) limits exhibit positive (negative) overnight returns
Htih A limit-hit asset exhibits greater trading activity in the day(s) after the limit-hit
Other (nonhit) stocks exhibit lower trading activity; i.e. they are more stable
Note(s): This table shows the hypotheses corresponding to issues addressed by this study: volatility spillover,
delayed price discovery, and trading interference
Table I.
Subperiods
under study
Table II.
Summary statistics of
subsamples
Table III.
List of hypotheses
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paper deviates slightly from Kim and Rhee’s approach by employing nonparametric Mann–
Whitney U test to determine if the different subsamples are equally volatile. Moreover, if a
particular asset triggers the limit on consecutive days, it is removed from the observation as
the latter limit hits constitute as discrete events. The price discovery delay hypothesis is
based on multiple return series constructed for all limit-hit securities, which are then used to
determinewhether prices experiencemore continuations or reversal on triggered days, as this
would be indicative of price limits impeding the process of discovery of fair prices (Miao et al.,
2017). Lastly, for the trading interference hypothesis, the theoreticians hold that if circuit
breakers indeed suppressed liquidity, trading volume would diminish drastically on the
triggered days and increase substantially thereafter (Sifat and Mohamad, 2018). As trading
activities wax on the subsequent trading days, rational trading is cut short on the day limit is
hit. This phenomenon is traditionally captured via a turnover ratio of trading activity, which
measures a proportional change of volume from preceding days (Lu, 2016; Wan et al., 2018)
We use Sc and Sf to denote groups of instruments that hit an upper (ceiling) and lower
(floor) limit. Adopting Christie et al.’s (2002) approach of a control period of continuous
trading for firms with similar net market returns, we use Spc (pseudo-ceiling) and Spf (pseudo-
floor) to represent stocks that experience a price change of at least±25 percent but did not hit
the limit. Some studies have used 80 percent and 90 percent of limits as threshold for pseudo-
groups (Chang and Hsieh, 2008). However, those markets typically use very tight price bands
(5–12.5 percent). Considering Bursa Malaysia’s wide magnitude of±30 percent, we choose to
use ±25 percent as control (pseudo) group threshold.
3.2 Volatility spillover
To test spillover, the genus of volatility matters, that is, whether fundamental or transitory.
The former occurs due to investors’ uncertainty on valuation of the firm, and the latter is
caused by uninformed trading. For regulators, curbing transitory volatility is desirable.
Traditional approaches in measuring volatility include close-to-close returns (Chen et al.,
2005; Fama, 1989), high-to-low returns (Grossman, 1988), and open-high-low-close (OHLC)
(Knight and Satchell, 2007). Grossman (1988) points out that close-to-close approach is
suitable as a proxy for asset/market direction but not to gauge turbulence. Besides, many
have argued that OHLC better captures transitory volatility (Fiess and MacDonald, 2002).
Moreover, OHLC approach is eight times more efficient as close-to-close (Bennett and Gil,
2012; Meilijson, 2011). Since we study financial crisis periods with known propensity for
overnight jumps, we adopt Yang and Zhang (2000) extension of Garman–Klass model (Eq.
(2)), which is argued to perform superior to other approaches due to ability to capture
overnight jumps—a pertinent and attractive feature considering universally high jump
nature of limit-hit sampling.
σgkyz ¼
ffiffiffi
F
n
r ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiXn
i¼1

ln

oi
ci1
2
þ 1
2

ln

hi
li
2
 ð2lnð2Þ  1Þ

ln

ci
oi
2vuut (2)
Here, N 5 each period’s time interval (set to 1 without loss of generality), F 5 fraction of
closed trading period (between 0 and 1), ci, hi, oi, li5 closing, high, opening, and lowest price at
period i.Next, due to variability of volatility across time, we create a standardized measure to
facilitate inter-subperiod comparison. Designating the limit-hit day as day t, we construct a
12-day window and thereupon build a standardized volatility index (SVI) based on σgkyz;t−1;
that is, volatility on the day before limit was hit (or ±25 percent move for Spc and Spf). Since
σgkyz;t−1 serves as the baseline for SVIt-1, it is assigned a value of 1.
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SVItþn ¼ In

σgkyz;tþn
σgkyz;t−1

(3)
SVItþn > 1 indicates higher volatility compared to the limit/pseudo-limit day’s trade. SVIt
always has a very high value, since the limit/pseudo-limit day is invariably a highly volatile
day. SVItþn ≤ 1 denotes decrease in volatility. Employing Mann–Whitney U test to measure
statistical significance and to bypass distribution-specific limitations of parametric tests,
SVItþn values for Sc and Sf are compared to Spc and Spf groups for corresponding
periods. Higher valueswould indicate higher volatility in post-hit periods compared to control
group and thereby affirm the volatility spillover hypothesis. The converse indicates a
desirable effect of price limits.
3.3 Delayed price discovery
To detect price continuation and/or reversal after a hit or pseudo-hit, overnight and intraday
returns are calculated.
rin;t ¼ lnct
ot
(4)
ron;t ¼ lnot
ct−1
(5)
We examine the rin,t and ron,t for two successive days following the hit/pseudo-hit day to
establish a continuity/reversal pattern. Designatingþ for price increase, for price decrease,
and 0 for no change, Tooma (2005) constructs a matrix, whereby continuity of limit/pseudo-
limit direction is classifiable as follows (Table IV):
We consider a continuity pattern confirmed when both intraday and overnight
classifications agree. Furthermore, to avoid data contamination by breaching maximum
price variation rules (George and Hwang, 2004), historical highest and lowest values are
discarded. This method of testing price continuation is consistent with delayed informed
trading hypothesis of Roll (1989), which suggests price reversal to be consistent with Ma
et al.’s (1989) overreaction hypothesis. Thus, we can conclude that price limits postpone
discovery of equilibrium price when unusually large proportion of price continuity is
observed for Sc and Sf compared to Spc and Spf. Moreover, we posit that disconfirming
continuity alone should not constitute evidence of price limits’ efficacy. Consistent with
DeBondt and Thaler’s (1985) hypothesis that extreme price movements in one direction
should be followed by strong reversal, we argue that an effective price limit mechanism
Movement Returns series Diagnosis
Upward [þ, þ] [0, þ] Continuity
[þ, ] [0, ] [, þ] [, 0] [,] Reversal
[þ, 0] [0, 0] Unchanged
Downward [,] [0, ] Continuity
[, þ] [0, þ] [þ,] [þ, 0] [þ, þ] Reversal
[, 0] [0, 0] Unchanged
Note(s): This table shows price patterns related to delayed price discovery hypothesis based on direction of
the returns series (Tooma, 2005)
Table IV.
Price discovery matrix
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should yield price reversal. As such, we introduce and focus on price reversal ratio (PRR) as
the primary performance metric (Eq. (5)–(6)). It is the ratio of number of stocks exhibiting
reversal patterns within the subgroup (ceiling, pseudo-ceiling, floor, pseudo-floor).
PRRup ¼
P
S½þ;−½0;−½−;þ½−;0½−;−P
Sðc;pcÞ
(6)
PRRdown ¼
P
S½−;þ½0;þ½þ;−½þ;0½þ;þP
Sðf ;pf Þ
(7)
3.4 Trading interference
We examine interference in trading activities following a large price move via two proxies: (1)
market-adjusted turnover ratio (MAT) and (2) on-balance volume (OBV). With the limit-hit
day being t, we compute a logarithmic percentage change in trade activities.
MATt ¼ Value of Stock Traded on day t
Market Capitalization on day t
(8)
ΔTAMAT ¼ ln

MATc;pc; f; pf→t
MATc;pc; f; pf→t−1

*100 (9)
TAOBV ¼ ln

OBVc;pc; f;pf→t
OBVc;pc; f;pf→t−1

*100 (10)
OBVt ¼ OBVt−1 þ
8<
:
Vt; if ct> ct−1
0; if ct ¼ ct−1
Vt if ct< ct−1
(11)
Using the day t-1 as the baseline for OBV,ΔTAMAT andΔTAOBV are calculated for until five
days after the limit (pseudo-limit) was hit. Higher ΔTAMAT and ΔTAOBV values tested to be
statistically significant under Mann–Whitney U test for Sc and Sf compared to Spc and Spf
subgroups for corresponding periods would indicate higher trading activities in post-hit
periods compared to control group and thereby affirm the volatility spillover hypothesis. The
converse indicates a desirable effect of price limits.
4. Empirical findings
4.1 Volatility spillover
For instruments incurring a significant price increase, as Tables IV and V demonstrate,
standardized volatility (SVI) values gradually retreat to∼1 for Sc and Spc groups from tþ 1 to
t þ 10. Moreover, Sc group outperforms the Spc for most time windows. This suggests
regression to normalcy (pre-limit volatility) for upward moving stocks. In other words, long-
run transitory volatility is tempered. Also, the phenomenon is most noticeable in the vicinity
of day t: that is, tþ 1 to tþ 4, suggesting an immediate subsidence in volatility. The results
hold true across tranquil and turbulent periods, although GFC results are less powerful. On
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the contrary, downward moving stocks exhibit mixed results, with only one tranquil
subperiod registering curtailed volatility. In tranquil markets, SVIf and SVIpf exhibit across-
the-board superior volatility recession with greater statistical significance compared to
upward moving stocks—evidenced by many values between 0.818 and 1. Pseudo-hit groups,
in general, outperform the hit groups. Additionally, unlike SVIc and SVIpc, higher proportions
of volatility recessions are observable around tþ 7 to tþ 10, indicating a deferred volatility
reduction. In the crisis market subperiods, limit-hit groups’ performance deteriorates, with
SVI values exceeding 1 for bulk of the trading days. Overall, upper price limits succeed in
restricting volatility in both tranquil and turbulent markets, while lower price limits fare
poorly—especially in crisis periods (see Table VI).
4.2 Delayed price discovery
To avoid arbitrary comparison of reversal performance across subgroups and subperiods, we
propose the following grading criteria (Table VII) and present our findings (Table VIII).
Asian financial crisis Global financial crisis
Panel A: Upward movements
Window SVIc SVIpc SVIc SVIpc
t1 1.000 5 1.000 1.000 5 1.000
t 2.774 >> 2.161 2.441 <<< 3.282
tþ1 2.387 < 2.901 1.829 << 1.938
tþ2 1.249 < 1.742 1.700 << 2.011
tþ3 1.605 < 1.695 1.596 1.076
tþ4 1.251 1.805 1.028 1.108
tþ5 0.992 2.827 1.190 < 1.366
tþ6 1.267 < 1.690 1.513 << 1.760
tþ7 0.999 1.173 0.989 0.923
tþ8 0.973 * < 1.266 0.987 * < 0.105
tþ9 1.138 < 1.163 1.092 < 1.164
tþ10 1.240 < 1.344 1.041 1.131
Observations 37 55 412 753
Panel B: Downward movements
Window SVIf SVIpf SVIf SVIpf
t1 1.000 5 1.000 1.000 5 1.000
t 2.189 >>> 2.014 1.881 >>> 1.557
tþ1 1.947 >>> 1.857 1.518 <<< 1.238
tþ2 1.971 >>> 1.837 1.421 >> 1.379
tþ3 1.259 < 1.757 1.193 << 1.221
tþ4 1.104 < 1.146 1.512 >> 1.058
tþ5 1.245 >> 1.213 1.245 < 1.342
tþ6 1.116 1.245 0.992 < 1.454
tþ7 1.108 < 1.317 1.108 < 1.127
tþ8 1.166 < 1.208 1.066 >> 0.993
tþ9 1.181 > 1.143 1.081 > 1.015
tþ10 1.197 > 1.186 1.203 > 1.186
Observations 712 1,189 893 1,589
Note(s): This table presents daily volatility neighboring limit-hit and pseudo-limit-hit days; day t. The
standardized volatility index (SVI) refers to the ratio of day’s volatility compared to the day before limit or
pseudo-limit hit; i.e. day t1. Volatility is computed as per Yang–Zhang extension of Garman–Klass estimator
(Eq. (2)). Panels A and B report volatility for up (Sc 5 ceiling, Spc 5 pseudo-ceiling) and down (SVIf 5 floor,
SVIpf5 pseudo-floor) moves, respectively. < and > denote significant less than and greater than relationships
between left-hand and right-hand values. * mark is used to SVI values significantly lower than 1, implying
subsided volatility compared to day t1. * * *, <<< and >>> are significant at 1%; * *, << and >> are
significant at 5%; *, <, and > are significant at 10% as per Mann–Whitney U test
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As seen in Table VII, no subgroup for any of the subperiods exhibited sufficient
magnitude of price reversal to attain a singleU. In tranquil times, third subperiods under
new and old limit regimes exhibit moderate reversal or outperform the pseudo-group for
upward price movement category. On the other hand, first two tranquil subperiods show
moderate reversal values.
In crisis market situations, price continuation was substantially high during AFC, while
moderate reversal was observed in the GFC (Table IX). The PRR values were noticeably
lower compared to price continuation value, with the highest PRR of 0.319 being during
second tranquil period. Overall, the results indicate poor performance of price limits in
generating price reversals and suggest decidedly strong all-around price continuity.
Criterion PRRc/f > PRRpc/pf Grade Remarks
PRR ≤ 0.25 Yes Mixed Discovery delayed but outperforms control group
PRR ≤ 0.25 No X Discovery delayed
0.25 < PRR ≤ 0.50 Yes U Moderate reversal
0.25 < PRR ≤ 0.50 No Mixed Moderate reversal but outperformed by control group
0.50 < PRR Yes UUU Superior reversal
0.50 < PRR No UU Superior reversal but outperformed by control group
Note(s): This table shows the grading scheme based on price reversal ratio and difference between limit-hit
and pseudo-limit groups’metrics to confirm a delay in reaching equilibrium price across tranquil and turbulent
markets
Tranquil periods
Subperiod 1 Subperiod 2 Subperiod 3(a) Subperiod 3(b)
Pattern Hit Pseudo-hit Hit Pseudo-hit Hit Pseudo-hit Hit Pseudo-hit
Limit up [þ, þ] 0.587 0.498 0.508 0.390 0.479 0.456 0.413 0.453
[þ, 0] 0.129 0.184 0.161 0.201 0.160 0.129 0.145 0.176
Continuity 0.716 0.682 0.669 0.591 0.639 0.585 0.558 0.629
[þ, ] 0.051 0.055 0.058 0.065 0.077 0.053 0.069 0.044
[0, ] 0.045 0.064 0.056 0.063 0.090 0.069 0.054 0.059
[, þ] 0.020 0.055 0.062 0.044 0.052 0.053 0.082 0.048
[, 0] 0.023 0.035 0.031 0.023 0.036 0.029 0.030 0.024
[,] 0.057 0.011 0.000 0.015 0.003 0.061 0.012 0.026
Reversal 0.195 0.221 0.207 0.211 0.258 0.266 0.247 0.202
[þ, 0] 0.076 0.065 0.077 0.125 0.084 0.106 0.166 0.117
[0, 0] 0.013 0.032 0.047 0.073 0.019 0.043 0.029 0.052
Unchanged 0.089 0.097 0.124 0.198 0.103 0.149 0.195 0.169
Limit down [,] 0.428 0.410 0.481 0.427 0.444 0.407 0.395 0.405
[0, ] 0.184 0.144 0.120 0.087 0.164 0.102 0.203 0.108
Continuity 0.612 0.554 0.601 0.514 0.608 0.509 0.598 0.513
[,þ] 0.077 0.074 0.077 0.090 0.048 0.094 0.056 0.079
[0, þ] 0.064 0.068 0.073 0.073 0.053 0.077 0.058 0.073
[þ,] 0.035 0.108 0.096 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.088
[þ, 0] 0.037 0.043 0.038 0.043 0.035 0.052 0.029 0.046
[þ, þ] 0.053 0.015 0.035 0.056 0.013 0.056 0.029 0.018
Reversal 0.267 0.308 0.319 0.332 0.219 0.348 0.243 0.304
[, 0] 0.076 0.083 0.052 0.105 0.147 0.120 0.129 0.150
[0, 0] 0.045 0.055 0.028 0.049 0.026 0.023 0.030 0.033
Unchanged 0.121 0.138 0.080 0.154 0.173 0.143 0.159 0.183
Note(s): This table presents the price reversal ratios as outlined in Eq. (5)–(6). Following criteria specified in
Table VII, PRR ≤ 0.25 and/or inferior performance compared to pseudo-hit groups constitutes inefficacy,
leading to a fail (X) grade, while a 0.25 < PRR ≤ 0.50 and/or out-performing pseudo-hit group constitutes a
“Mixed” grade. No passing (U) grade (superior price reversal) was documented
The italicized values indicate significance at 5% or better.
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4.3 Trading interference
Using market-adjusted turnover as a proxy for trading activities, as exhibited in Tables X
and XI, trading action slows down for both upper and lower limits in tranquil markets, with a
minor exception of third subperiod under new limit regime.
For crisis periods, however, the opposite is observed (Tables XII–XIII). Trading activities
appear to deteriorate following the limit-hit days; only the lower limit stocks during GFC
showmixed results. Most subperiods in both tranquil and turbulent markets show some level
of trading deceleration around t þ 2 and t þ 3, albeit with mixed statistical significance.
The most striking exacerbation of trading activities is observed for the downward price
movements during AFC, scoring positive ΔTAMAT values all through t þ 1 to t þ 5.
5. Implications
The findings of this study are mixed but marginally favor the regulatory practice of ±30
percent limits in Malaysia. Previous empirical results from Malaysia and other emerging
markets broadly indicate deteriorated ex-post market quality. Based on this paper’s results
alone, a case cannot be made for abandonment of price limits. Instead, fine-tuning the limit
mechanism further should be on the cards. The asymmetric nature of ex-post effects of upper
and lower limits suggests that asymmetric limits may be used. By far, the limits perform
worse in bearish scenarios—a scenario that they are designed to perform well in. Like most
emerging markets that are “mostly long” or “long only,” Bursa Malaysia regulators are less
Crisis periods
AFC (1997–1998) GFC (2008)
Pattern Hit Pseudo-hit Hit Pseudo-hit
Limit up [þ, þ] 0.680 0.484 0.494 0.384
[þ, 0] 0.139 0.129 0.108 0.142
Continuity 0.819 0.613 0.602 0.526
[þ, ] 0.026 0.074 0.056 0.095
[0, ] 0.025 0.068 0.067 0.088
[, þ] 0.016 0.074 0.064 0.130
[, 0] 0.015 0.034 0.042 0.042
[,] 0.032 0.059 0.050 0.027
Reversal 0.114 0.309 0.279 0.381
[þ, 0] 0.054 0.050 0.087 0.064
[0, 0] 0.013 0.028 0.032 0.029
Unchanged 0.067 0.078 0.119 0.093
Limit down [,] 0.661 0.382 0.497 0.411
[0, ] 0.145 0.172 0.102 0.090
Continuity 0.806 0.554 0.599 0.501
[,þ] 0.020 0.062 0.074 0.068
[0, þ] 0.024 0.068 0.061 0.068
[þ,] 0.012 0.083 0.072 0.092
[þ, 0] 0.013 0.034 0.028 0.049
[þ, þ] 0.032 0.062 0.020 0.031
Reversal 0.102 0.308 0.256 0.308
[, 0] 0.061 0.094 0.088 0.122
[0, 0] 0.031 0.044 0.057 0.069
Unchanged 0.092 0.138 0.145 0.191
Note(s): This table presents the price reversal ratios as outlined in Eq. (5)–(6). Following criteria specified in
Table VII, PRR ≤ 0.25 and/or inferior performance compared to pseudo-hit groups constitutes inefficacy,
leading to a fail (X) grade, while a 0.25 < PRR ≤ 0.50 and/or out-performing pseudo-hit group constitutes a
“Mixed” grade. No passing (U) grade (superior price reversal) was documented
Table IX.
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likely to be worried about a miscalibrated price limit for upper limits. Hence, it is suggested
that the exchange, leveraging its own access to granular data, investigates the timing of the
lower limit hits for a much larger time period, preferably since the early 2000s, when
sophisticated trading platform arrived at Malaysia. For fund managers, the asymmetric
findings highlight the need for risk minimization strategies and weight assignment
techniques during portfolio reshuffling stages—especially if turbulent markets are
anticipated. For traders, cues on taking profit or cutting losses can be derived in
extraordinary price swing scenarios.
6. Conclusion
Empirical works on price limits’ efficacy are no longer scarce. Though we accede that such
attempts are merited in normal market situations, limits’ potency in achieving the declared
regulatory objectives warrants greater scrutiny in stressful times. Puzzlingly, nearly all
circuit breaker researchers omitted this crucial angle. To redress this, we test price limits’ role
in curbing volatility, easing price discovery, and interfering with trading activities in
Malaysia in both tranquil and crisis periods since 1994. Our findings suggest a
comprehensive performance of limits in tempering volatility in bullish markets (crisis or
otherwise) but mixed to poor results in bearish scenarios. The limits also appear to delay
discovery of price equilibrium after large pricemoves. In terms of interference, the price limits
do not appear to inhibit traders’ trading activities when prices are moving up in tranquil
markets but display mixed results when prices fall. However, they do appear to severely
Panel A: ΔTAMAT for upward movements
Asian financial crisis Global financial crisis
Window Sf Spf Sf Spf
t 72.421 56.741 41.643 << 46.258
tþ1 7.821 >> 12.904 12.799 >>> 11.627
tþ2 24.109 7.558 17.001 18.105
tþ3 4.518 > 15.906 17.556 >> 5.381
tþ4 4.202 19.738 8.227 > 11.077
tþ5 1.255 >>> 9.637 8.331 12.292
N 37 55 412 753
Panel B: ΔTAMAT for downward movements
Asian financial crisis Global financial crisis
Window Sf Spf Sf Spf
t 17.512 << 34.238 45.144 >> 39.501
tþ1 31.152 42.711 22.77 16.698
tþ2 19.71 > 19.581 34.104 < 38.367
tþ3 11.331 19.327 21.474 27.439
tþ4 8.832 >>> 28.65 22.68 > 15.12
tþ5 8.715 >> 5.769 16.145 >> 17.431
N 712 1,189 893 11,589
Note(s): This table shows change in market-adjusted turnover during crisis markets using t1 as a baseline.
þ and  values represent increase and decrease in trading activities, as calculated by Eq. (8)–(9). Due to the
limit (pseudo-limit) day being a very active day, understandably, t exhibits very high positive values. Panels A
and B report ΔTAMAT for up and down moves, respectively. < and > denote significant less than and greater
than relationships between left-hand and right-hand values. <<< and >>> are significant at 1%; << and >>
are significant at 5%; <, and > are significant at 10% as per Mann–Whitney U test. Subgroups: Sc5 ceiling,
Spc 5 pseudo-ceiling, Sf 5 floor, Spf 5 pseudo-floor
Table XI.
Trading interference in
crisis periods via
market-adjusted
turnover
Ex-post effects
of circuit
breakers
345
P
an
el
A
:Δ
T
A
O
B
V
fo
r
u
p
w
ar
d
m
ov
em
en
ts
W
in
d
ow
T
ra
n
q
u
il
p
er
io
d
1
T
ra
n
q
u
il
p
er
io
d
2
T
ra
n
q
u
il
p
er
io
d
3
(o
ld
li
m
it
)
T
ra
n
q
u
il
p
er
io
d
3
(n
ew
li
m
it
)
S
c
S
p
c
S
c
S
p
c
S
c
S
p
c
S
c
S
p
c
t
45
.0
34
27
.2
61
19
.5
72
<
36
.9
81
48
.2
03
>
>
>
45
.0
55
37
.9
54
<
<
68
.8
09
tþ
1
33
.0
06
>
9
.5
08
13
.7
09
<
17
.7
74
6
6.
53
9
<
<
<
33
.2
88
0
.1
45
<
<
<
31
.4
80
tþ
2
6
8.
46
6
<
<
14
.6
14
14
.5
81
41
.0
45
6.
60
1
<
<
12
.0
07
2
5.
80
4
>
>
>
3
9.
99
3
tþ
3
7
.0
25
1
0.
88
5
1
2.
15
0
<
<
1
0.
25
1
3
5.
41
6
<
<
19
.3
05
26
.9
87
<
45
.0
11
tþ
4
2
2.
31
5
<
<
7.
63
7
3
7.
63
1
<
2
0.
91
4
46
.9
21
>
1
8.
95
7
0.
42
5
2
0.
00
9
tþ
5
1
5.
34
9
1
7.
87
7
3.
81
3
5
.2
43
7
.1
73
<
<
<
47
.4
49
2
0.
43
9
>
>
3
0.
12
5
N
30
53
20
7
41
1
80
2
1,
21
4
61
81
P
an
el
B
:Δ
T
A
O
B
V
fo
r
d
ow
n
w
ar
d
m
ov
em
en
ts
T
ra
n
q
u
il
p
er
io
d
1
T
ra
n
q
u
il
p
er
io
d
2
T
ra
n
q
u
il
p
er
io
d
3
(o
ld
li
m
it
)
T
ra
n
q
u
il
p
er
io
d
3
(n
ew
li
m
it
)
W
in
d
ow
S
c
S
p
c
S
c
S
p
c
S
c
S
p
c
S
c
S
p
c
t
61
.9
82
>
>
40
.7
28
76
.1
46
>
>
>
37
.1
37
54
.0
86
>
34
.6
44
25
.4
74
70
.4
42
tþ
1
3
0.
59
8
<
<
<
2
8.
29
2
1
4.
17
5
15
.8
13
5
1.
46
4
<
<
<
1
0.
20
1
3
3.
13
4
<
9.
79
4
tþ
2
5
.8
40
<
<
<
29
.9
50
4.
36
3
<
<
18
.0
23
9
.2
01
<
2
.4
49
2
5.
52
8
<
<
9
.8
96
tþ
3
82
.1
37
2
5.
66
6
43
.0
66
26
.1
21
8
.5
20
>
4
0.
32
8
41
.1
72
5
.7
11
tþ
4
4
5.
41
6
<
<
28
.9
68
4
3.
11
8
<
<
4
6.
65
1
31
.5
59
<
<
45
.1
55
37
.5
01
9
.9
62
tþ
5
2
.5
78
1
.0
31
2
2.
67
7
<
1
7.
35
7
5
9.
19
9
<
<
<
1
0.
57
5
1
3.
19
4
2
2.
54
9
N
30
7
53
4
26
7
56
6
1,
51
3
2,
60
2
56
6
93
4
N
o
te
(s
):
P
an
el
s
A
an
d
B
in
th
e
T
ab
le
ab
ov
e
sh
ow
ch
an
g
e
in
on
b
al
an
ce
d
u
ri
n
g
tr
an
q
u
il
m
ar
k
et
s
u
si
n
g
t
1
as
a
b
as
el
in
e.
þ
an
d

v
al
u
es
re
p
re
se
n
t
in
cr
ea
se
an
d
d
ec
re
as
e
in
tr
ad
in
g
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s,
as
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
b
y
E
q
.(
10
)–
(1
1)
.D
u
e
to
th
e
li
m
it
(p
se
u
d
o-
li
m
it
)d
ay
b
ei
n
g
a
v
er
y
ac
ti
v
e
d
ay
,u
n
d
er
st
an
d
ab
ly
,t
ex
h
ib
it
s
v
er
y
h
ig
h
p
os
it
iv
e
v
al
u
es
.P
an
el
s
A
an
d
B
re
p
or
t
Δ
T
A
O
B
V
fo
r
u
p
an
d
d
ow
n
m
ov
es
,r
es
p
ec
ti
v
el
y
.<
an
d
>
d
en
ot
e
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t
le
ss
th
an
an
d
g
re
at
er
th
an
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
s
b
et
w
ee
n
le
ft
-h
an
d
an
d
ri
g
h
t-
h
an
d
v
al
u
es
.<
<
<
an
d
>
>
>
ar
e
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t
at
1%
;<
<
an
d
>
>
ar
e
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t
at
5%
;<
,a
n
d
>
ar
e
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t
at
10
%
as
p
er
M
an
n
–
W
h
it
n
ey
U
te
st
.S
u
b
g
ro
u
p
s:
S
c
5
ce
il
in
g
,
S
p
c
5
p
se
u
d
o-
ce
il
in
g
,S
f
5
fl
oo
r,
S
p
f
5
p
se
u
d
o-
fl
oo
r
Table XII.
Tests of trading
interference hypothesis
across tranquil periods
via on-balance volume
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Panel A: ΔTAOBV for upward movements
Asian financial crisis
Global financial
crisis
Window Sc Spc Sc Spc
t 51.789 >>> 32.713 42.898 >>> 35.132
tþ1 5.977 > 10.364 22.75 < 14.219
tþ2 58.881 13.445 18.372 << 33.657
tþ3 27.095 << 11.102 10.692 >> 12.506
tþ4 18.968 8.095 12.739 > 24.051
tþ5 18.419 > 23.249 24.919 5.715
N 37 55 412 753
Panel B: ΔTAOBV for downward movements
Window
Asian financial crisis Global financial crisis
Sf Spf Sf Spf
t 48.221 < 53.579 80.614 48.466
tþ1 36.412 << 29.707 14.317 28.292
tþ2 6.132 >> 8.153 5.541 << 24.858
tþ3 31.85 > 28.746 52.11 >>> 7.462
tþ4 10.875 > 9.837 19.155 >>> 29.258
tþ5 12.449 >> 21.309 22.677 0.969
N 712 1,189 893 1,589
Note(s): This table shows change in on-balance volume during turbulent markets using t1 as a baseline.þ
and  values represent increase and decrease in trading activities, as calculated by Eq. (10)–(11). Due to the
limit (pseudo-limit) day being a very active day, understandably, t exhibits very high positive values. Panels A
and B report ΔTAOBV for up and down moves, respectively. < and > denote significant less than and greater
than relationships between left-hand and right-hand values. <<< and >>> are significant at 1%; << and >>
are significant at 5%; <, and > are significant at 10% as per Mann–Whitney U test. Subgroups: Sc5 ceiling,
Spc 5 pseudo-ceiling, Sf 5 floor, Spf 5 pseudo-floor
Summary of findings
Tranquil market Turbulent market
Subperiod
1
Subperiod
2
Subperiod
3(a)
Subperiod
3(b)
Asian
(1997–
1998)
Global
(2008)
Volatility Limit
up
U U U U U U
Limit
down
X U Mixed X X Mixed
Price
Discovery
Limit
up
X X Mixed Mixed X Mixed
Limit
down
Mixed Mixed X X X Mixed
Trading
Interference
Limit
up
U U U U X X
Limit
down
U U U X X Mixed
Note(s): This table summarizes the findings of the paper vis-a-vis hypotheses tested across Tranquil and
Turbulentmarket conditions for upward and downwardmoves.U denotes improvement ofmarket quality (i.e.
reduced volatility, lessened interference in trading, and faster price discovery), and X the opposite (i.e.
exacerbated volatility, greater interference in trading, and delayed price discovery). Mixed grade refers to
nonconclusive findings due to conflicting results across subgroups and/or subperiods
Table XIII.
Tests of trading
interference hypothesis
across crisis periods
via on-balance volume
Table XIV.
Summary of
hypotheses testing
Ex-post effects
of circuit
breakers
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impede trading activities in crisis periods. Table XIV consolidates the variegated results of all
tested hypotheses.
Explaining causality of the surfacedpatterns is beyond the scope of this paper. For instance,
what role did Prime Minister Mahathir’s capital control play in post-1997 panic? Did
introduction and thereafter brusque banning of short selling in the 1990s contribute to trend in
earlier subperiods? What about reintroduction of short selling in the new millennium and
restricting it again later?Moreover, the role of Shariah consonant investment (a subdiscipline of
finance/investment rooted in Islamic values—of which Malaysia is a major global exponent)
funds and strategies (which heavily favor housing, power, and manufacturing sectors) could
provide exciting insights into thematter.We also encourage the cognoscenti to link the findings
to fundamental aspects of firms, possible roles of ownership structure, dividend pay-out policy,
and—on a broader level—potential roles of regulatory variables such as microstructure
control, changes in surveillance/monitoring regimes, and so on.
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